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Integrating political psychology and decision neuroscience for the study of political judgment has made a strong beginning by using sound theoretical frameworks of human cognition, emotion and decision making. Yet, a more comprehensive theory of the role of emotion in decision making will be needed to account for the range of observations to be yielded by the interdisciplinary research program envisioned by several authors in this volume (Schreiber 2005; Cassino and Lodge 2005; Lupia and Menning 2005; MacKuen et al. 2005; Feldman, Huddy, and Cassese 2005) . Continued success in bridging political psychology and decision neuroscience depends, then, on recognizing theoretical challenges against which progress in scientific conceptualization and communication will be measured. This section considers a number of challenges in developing such a comprehensive theory of the function of emotion in decision making. Attention to these challenges is important in order to specify what it is that a better theory should accomplish, such that one has criteria in hand for the evaluation of new proposals. Specifically, we discuss the weight of dichotomies that inform models of human cognition, emotion and decision; the meanings of two terms, cognition and emotion, within one of these dichotomies; and the central evolutionary and cultural context of the social for the normative evaluation of decision making strategies. We conclude this section with a proposal for how to think about emotional processing, drawing upon two highly influential and effective frameworks: Appraisal Theory (AT) and the somatic marker hypothesis (SMH).
2.a. The weight of traditional dichotomies
Traditional models of human thought, feeling and judgment make use of two dichotomies whose influence has weighed heavily on all subsequent scientific approaches seeking to bridge them. The two dichotomies in mind here are those between controlled and automatic processing and between cognition and emotion. To the degree to which these dichotomies are not used as heuristics but are reified in hard theoretical distinctions, they are false. Yet, despite the careful, bridge-building work of many scholars, these dichotomies still wield considerable conceptual power. A brief consideration of these dichotomies and their problems is useful to help recognize their influence and perhaps avoid them in future theory building.
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The first dichotomy -indeed dualism -we examine is that between controlled and automatic mental processing, generally instantiated in "dual process" models of human cognition Shiffrin and Schneider 1977; Simon 1979; Broadbent 1971) . Dual process models hypothesize two distinct cognitive and/or neural systems mediating, on the one hand, the top-down or goal-directed or endogenous control of thought and activity (e.g., attention), and, on the other hand, mental processing that is not controlled, labeled bottom-up or automatic or exogenous. Controlled processing is often associated with processing that is consciously, even reflectively, directed, and a recent account has labeled such consciously aware processing "refleCtive" processing, in contradistinction to automatic, or "refleXive" processing, yielding a "C"-and "X"-system dichotomous model of decision making (Lieberman, Schreiber, and Ochsner 2003 ). Yet, as pointed out by Feldman Barrett et al. (2004) , controlled, or top-down, processing need not always be under conscious control. For example, someone with a conscious goal of desiring a good meal at a restaurant and who makes a conscious decision to look at the menu to accomplish this goal most often will not be consciously controlling detailed visual scanning of the menu. Nonetheless, in this case the person's visual attention to the menu is under top-down control, since attention was the result of a goal-directed decision, and a conscious one at that. That is, instead of looking out the window or at the salt shaker on the table, the person decided to look at the menu.
While there is clear experimental evidence for some distinction between behaviors that are influenced by conscious control and those that are not, it is unclear that postulating separate, non-overlapping systemsone for controlled the other for automatic processing -aids in understanding the mechanisms behind the data. Dual process models can cloud such understanding, since they deemphasize the fact that automatic processing is always involved in human activity, even during conscious control of decision making. For example, the controlled focus of attention in recalling a specific memory involves millions of changes in the brain that are not under the conscious control of the person doing the remembering. The same is true when a person makes a political judgment, as discussed by Cassino and Lodge (2005) . Further, dual process models tend to neglect the role of controlled processing in activating and modulating automatic processing, as would be the case when someone tries to remember a person she likes versus a song she cannot stand, or the Emotional processing and political judgment 6 positive versus the negative qualities of a candidate for whom she did not vote. Controlled processing can have clearly observable effects on the processing of stimuli such as words or faces or memories are processed, even though the control does not extend to the millions of brain events in such processing. For example, the outcome of a visual search for a lost item in a room cluttered with objects will be influenced strongly by the image of the item one consciously has in mind while searching for it. If one has a false image of the item in mind, finding it may take much longer, if it is found at all. So the conscious image exerts an effect on all of the processing in the millions of brain events going on during the search, even without conscious control of those automatic events.
Upon careful consideration of the ubiquitous presence of automatic processing with controlled processing, and of the demonstrable effects of controlled processing upon automatic brain processes, it is clear that postulating two distinct processing systems obscures more than it reveals. Recently, some authors have acknowledged the intricate interplay of controlled and automatic processing, and have called for "drastically revising the dual-process story as we now know it" (Feldman Barrett, Tugage, and Engle 2004, p. 567) . Similarly, the account by MacKuen et al. (2005) is consistent with the idea that automatic brain processes, such as those that give rise to moderate anxiety in uncertain circumstances, can fruitfully influence controlled processing such as information gathering in making deliberative decisions. Now we turn to the dichotomy between cognition and emotion. The scientific propensity in the 20 th Century (cf. Hilgard 1980; Scherer 1993) to devalue emotional processes in human judgment, in comparison to thought or cognition, and to divide emotional processing from "cognition" remains in a manner such that newer models of human judgment perpetuate, perhaps unintentionally, this division and devaluation. Indeed, the pervasive influence of this conceptual and valuational dichotomy is no doubt partially responsible for the widespread misconception that emotion is univocally devalued within the Western philosophical tradition (Neblo 2005) . Emotion has been typically characterized as automatic (vs. deliberative), maladaptive (vs. useful), innate (vs. learned), and so on, making it appear threatening to any systematic account of reasoned deliberative thought. Dividing emotional processing cleanly from and devaluing it in comparison to cognition was characteristic of dominant information processing models of human mentation through the 1980s
Emotional processing and political judgment 7 (Simon 1979; but see Erdelyi 1974; Bruner and Postman 1947) . Although work has progressed from viewing emotions as "non-problem-solving non-behaviour" (Gunderson 1985, 72) to the point now where treating cognition as separate from and independent of emotional processing is construed by some as a "sin" against affective neuroscience (Davidson 2003) , and though there is an increasing "Zeitgeist [that] seems to be dominated by efforts to integrate rather than oppose cognition and emotion" (Scherer 2003, 563) , recent theoretical interpretations still draw sharp distinctions between, and even maintain the independence of, emotional processing and cognition (Greene 2003; Marcus 2000; Goel and Dolan 2003) . Further, many interactionist approaches associate emotional processing only with suboptimal and/or subrational outcomes in decision making (Lieberman, Schreiber, and Ochsner 2003; Lieberman, Jarcho, and Satpute 2004; Winkielman and Berridge 2003; Mellers, Schwartz, and Cooke 1998; Mellers 2000) . This may be due in part to the influence of research in behavioral economics and rationality, which reports findings in terms of theoretical norms of the behaviors of interest, and without consideration of potential everyday adaptive functions of the component processes under investigation (Shafir and LeBoeuf 2002; Kahneman and Tversky 1979, 1982) . Several interactionist models draw on the dual-process (i.e., automatic vs. controlled) models of information processing discussed above, and go on to restrict the domain of controlled processing to cognition absent emotional processing (Lieberman, Schreiber, and Ochsner 2003) . While it is clear that emotional processing often will interfere with adaptive judgment and decision making, an unintentional or uncritical, heavy reliance on the received constructs described above will yield theoretical constructs that make no room for the possibility that emotional processes also function in ways that are necessary and adaptive.
The last word on moving beyond the dichotomy between cognition and emotion should belong to a pair of classic papers in psychology that yielded one of the laws of psychology, in this case one relating emotion and behavioral performance (Easterbrook 1959; Yerkes and Dodson 1908) . The law in question is the Yerkes-Dodson Law, which simply states that performance depends on the level of emotion -often defined as arousal -such that performance is low at very low and very high levels of emotion, and optimal somewhere in between. The conceptual framework of the Yerkes-Dodson Law was put forward by Emotional processing and political judgment 8 Easterbrook (1959) based on original observations by Yerkes and Dodson (1908) in order to unify a literature showing both adaptive and maladaptive effects of emotion on various measures of performance.
Interactionist models of cognition and emotion may draw upon the large literature surrounding this classic work in psychology in supporting a view which accounts for adaptive functions of emotion within cognition.
2.b. The meanings of cognition and emotion
Even after one has set aside the sharp distinction between cognition and emotion, a brief consideration of the various meanings of these terms is required before attempting to bridge the traditional distinctions between them. This is especially true for the present work toward integrating approaches from political psychology and decision neuroscience. Do political psychology and neuroscience refer to the same phenomenon when they refer to cognition? to emotion? In several important respects, the answer will be no, as we will see. Discovering ways in which the two fields' uses of the terms meaningfully overlap and where they differ will aid in developing new experimental paradigms that integrate the strengths of each field for the understanding of political judgment.
2.b.i. Cognition
The term "cognition" is used within most philosophical treatments of judgment and decision making and mainstream views within political psychology (Marcus 2000, 247; Taber 2003; MacKuen et al. 2005) as meaning thought-knowledge, and thus referring to conscious, intentional processes (Lakoff and Johnson 1999, 11-12) . Such usage is consistent with the origin of cognitive neuroscience within cognitive psychology. "Cognitive neuroscience" as a term emerged from a conversation in a taxicab between the cognitive psychologist George A. Miller and the neuroscientist Michael S. Gazzaniga, with an aim to "study how the brain enables the mind" (Gazzaniga, Ivry, and Mangun 1998, p. 1) . The aspects of mind to be investigated were perception, attention, memory, language, learning, reasoning, judgment, and higher order thought, all of Emotional processing and political judgment 9 which can come under conscious control. Given the emphasis on the role of brain processing in each of these cognitive activities, and the fact that most of the brain processes would be beyond conscious control, cognitive neuroscience did not restrict the term "cognitive" to mean conscious processing. Today, cognitive neuroscience generally follows cognitive psychology in referring to "cognition" as having to do with information processing, conscious or not, that contributes to any of the above-mentioned mental activities.
However, it must be emphasized that the use of the term "cognition" to include non-conscious, automatic processing is a specialized usage developed within cognitive psychology/neuroscience, and one that does not overlap with the use of cognition in political psychology, political science more broadly, or most other academic discourse. Thus, for the purposes of this discussion, and we suggest in the interest of future integrative work between political psychology and cognitive neuroscience, the term "cognitive" will be used in its standard meaning of conscious processing for the mental activities listed above.
Nevertheless, there is still a worry that, to the extent that this approach to cognition -or conscious mental activity -relies upon automatic processing, it leaves little or no room for the kind of decision making required for a deliberative democracy (Neblo 2005) . Indeed, some interpretations of the influence of automatic processing leave little or no room for controlled processing at all, including for setting the goals that guide decisions (Wegner 2002; Bargh and Chartrand 1999; Bargh et al. 2001 ). This concern is one of the motivations for dual-process theories of decision making, discussed in section 2.a., since this structure affords a way to retain conscious processing along with automaticity in judgment. Proponents of dual-process models often associate the automatic processing system with routine discriminations, judgments or decisions that do not involve situations of novelty or deep conflict. Once novel or seriously conflicting signals arise, the controlled processing system is brought online, taking over from the automatic processing system in order to manage the novel situation or conflict. Such an approach is described for political judgment in Lieberman et al. (2003) . The authors propose that political judgment relies mainly on automatic, reflexive processing (the X-system) until a situation of real novelty or serious conflict arises, resulting in the activation of the conscious, reflective C-system. As political sophistication increases, the X-system is made increasingly coherent such that recognizing inconsistencies during political decision making becomes more automatic and Emotional processing and political judgment 10 more efficient, requiring less conscious control of attention, and thus less need of the C-system. Yet when political realities remain resistant to decisions resulting from the X-system, the C-system will be activated so that more nuanced political strategies may be identified.
As pointed out in section 2.a., this approach has problems because there can be no C-system divorced from automatic processing. Fortunately, the dual-system dichotomy is not necessary to retain a place for controlled processing in political judgment, something so necessary to deliberative democracy. There are three elements to solving the apparent problem for deliberation. The first is to recall that the learning process by which political sophistication increases, as in all cases of explicit (vs. implicit) learning, depends largely on controlled processing. The second is to recall the role of controlled cognitive processing in regulating processing beyond conscious control (section 2.a.). Finally, one must recall that any experiment showing the influence of automatic processing entails evidence of controlled processing as well, without which the research participants could not have accomplished the required tasks.
This basic view is reflected in the work that Schreiber (2005) summarizes. Political sophisticates doubtlessly required deliberative control as they learned the political actors and associations inherent to political sophistication, and used this knowledge early on in their development as experts. Neuroimaging during this learning process, had it been employed, likely would have revealed clearly reduced activation in the "default network" associated with self-relative evaluation first described by and summarized by Schreiber, as was observed for political novices in his experiment. Similarly, the fact that sophisticates increasingly activated this default network during political judgment, compared to resting baseline, does not imply that they exhibited a mindless reliance on reflex. Rather, such increase in activation indicates a more personal engagement with the task along with a style of processing that relies more on selfrelative evaluations rather than on abstractly held associations. Indeed, recent work demonstrates that the resting default network is strongly decreased in Alzheimers, compared to healthy age-matched controls, suggesting that the network is involved in engaged, healthy cognition with respect to one's environment (Greicius et al. 2004) .
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2.b.ii. Emotion
Gaining clarity in the meanings of key terms related to emotion is imperative in moving toward the integration of political psychology and decision neuroscience. Recent history in the field of emotion research has already yielded a case in which semantic differences over "emotion" were mistakenly cast as deep disagreements over functional aspects of respective models (Leventhal and Scherer 1987) . To begin with, one must recognize that some operational definitions of emotion are restricted to a few emotional categories (e.g., fear, anger, joy) while others attempt to explain emotion in terms of a few theoretical dimensions (e.g., (Larsen, Norris, and Cacioppo 2003) . Marcus et al. (2000; prefer to model the action of emotion with a dual systems model in which the basic emotions of enthusiasm and anxiety interact to influence political judgment under different conditions. Within this model, they define "emotion" as requiring conscious awareness and "mood" as occurring at the "fringes" of conscious awareness. Everything outside of conscious awareness is labeled simply "affective responses" (Marcus, Neuman, and Mackuen 2000, p. 40) .
Other meanings of the key terms of emotional processing (i.e., "emotion," "mood," "affect," and "feeling") occur within political psychology. There is often no distinction between the terms "emotion" and 12 "feeling," "emotion" can be a kind of rule for categorization (Cassino and Lodge 2005) , and, most interestingly, "affect" can be taken as measurable via a verbal or written response (Feldman, Huddy, and Cassese 2005) or via unconscious priming (Cassino and Lodge 2005) .
These usages of the key terms of emotional processing in political psychology are different from those within decision neuroscience. Within the frameworks of decision neuroscience, affect, mood and emotion can occur independent of or concurrent with awareness. The term "feeling" is generally reserved for the quale, or first-person experience, associated with emotional processing (Damasio 1994 (Damasio , 1996 (Damasio , 1999 , and thus feeling requires consciousness. Perhaps most importantly, the demonstration of "affective response" in decision neuroscience requires a clear link to one or more accepted physiological signals and cannot be based solely on verbal responses or performance measures. Thus, "affect" retains its original connotation of developing in response to situations that palpably affect the body in some way. Typical measurements of affect include brain activity and psychophysiological measures such as skin conductance response (SCR), electrocardiography, muscle tension, pupillary dilation. The difference between decision neuroscience and political psychology in construing "affect" is due to the difference in level of explanation each ultimately seeks. Decision neuroscience seeks neural mechanisms of role of emotion within decision making, and therefore needs to measure emotional processing during decision processes. Political psychology aims at determining the effects of emotional categories and constructs in political judgment. Whether the emotions occur at the time of judgment or during the encoding of concepts that are then only later retrieved for the purposes of judgment is less important to this latter goal than to the aims of decision neuroscience.
Still, decision neuroscience can offer political psychology tools with which to answer questions that require knowing the level of emotional processing during conceptual encoding. One example of when such a measure would be useful is in determining whether a verbal or written report of emotional response to a given political advertisement or news story is consistent with emotional processing at the time of viewing or requires the hypothesis of other factors, such as associative memory or the developing social context, organized (i.e., "spin") or otherwise, in the wake of the publicity (Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2005) .
Distinguishing between these possibilities could be of great interest to those involved in the design, broadcast Emotional processing and political judgment 13 and hype of political advertisements or stories. More importantly, such distinctions could result in better scholarly models of political judgment in response to political broadcasts. In any case, this example shows that differences in the use of the key terms of emotional processing are no barrier to integrating political psychology and decision neuroscience, provided the differences are acknowledged and the operational definitions are appropriate for the experimental ends in view.
2.c. The centrality of the social
Another theoretical challenge deserves brief mention here. It is the challenge posed by the complexity of human social organization, in cultural and evolutionary terms, to meaningful experimental design and particularly to productive interpretation of results. The basic notion at play here is that the "centrality of personal ties and social interactions" within human evolution and in research participants' subcultural contexts shape the function of the component processes under investigation (Cacioppo et al. 2000, 831) . Behavioral decision theoretic approaches are often eager to apply particular norms in evaluating the decisions people make under experimental conditions, and the inferred effects of emotion on those decisions (Gigerenzer and Selten 2002; Kahneman and Tversky 1996; Gigerenzer 1994) , with little attention to the role of emotion in developing and maintaining social relationships. Behavioral decision theorists sometimes argue as if it would be desirable for humans to manifest less emotional processing, so that the norms of rational decision making -as set in the laboratory -can be attained. For example, Baumeister and colleagues (2005) suggest that emotional processing concurrent with decision making is so harmful that one would expect an evolutionary advantage for "people with fewer and fainter emotions" (p. 10). Yet a person's emotional processing systems are known to be involved in effectively judging the emotions of other people (Adolphs 2001 (Adolphs , 2002 (Adolphs , 2003 , and dysfunction in these emotional systems is likely partially responsible for such social deficits as autism (Baron-Cohen 1997; Baron-Cohen et al. 2000; Frith 2003 ). Social belonging is affected by deficits in social processing, and thus belonging would seem to depend upon emotional processing concurrent with judgment and decision making in social contexts. Given Baumeister's important Emotional processing and political judgment 14 work on the serious detrimental effects of social exclusion on cognition (Twenge, Catanese, and Baumeister 2002; Baumeister, Twenge, and Nuss 2002) , it is clear that evolutionary pressures would favor, rather than select against, emotional processing concurrent with judgment in social contexts. Losing sight of the centrality of the social element present in the evolutionary and cultural constraints on the range of human judgment can lead to erroneous conclusions regarding the role and necessity of emotion in decision.
It is important in making normative evaluations about experimental results of decision making in the laboratory that one keep two things in mind. The first is that it is quite difficult to create naturalistic social contexts in the laboratory within which to properly evaluate the adaptive role of emotion in judgment. The second is that one needs to be certain that emotional inductions or manipulations used in the laboratory result in emotional processing that is within the optimal range of emotion in a Yerkes-Dodson relation, assuming there is an optimal range for the task at hand. Consider that mood induction, such as the induction of sadness via a film clip, may result in a high level of emotion, and so would predictably interfere with optimal social judgment, for example. Consider also that temporarily inactivating emotional brain centers such as the amygdala, the insula, or orbitofrontal cortex would yield a similar performance deficit.
2.d. Recurrent multilevel appraisal: a proposal for emotional processing in decision making
We now present a proposal that seeks to develop the concept of emotional processing within the context of complex decision making. We use the key term of "emotional processing," instead of simply "emotion," both to ensure that the framework allows for the categories of feeling, mood, affect and motivation, in addition to emotion, as well as to stress the dynamical character of processing that precedes such categorization (Scherer 2000 (Scherer , 2003 . We frame emotional processing by drawing on both Appraisal Theory, or AT (Ellsworth and Scherer 2003; Lazarus 1991 Lazarus , 1991 Scherer 2003) , and on the somatic marker hypothesis, or SMH (Damasio 1996 (Damasio , 1994 , resulting in a processing scheme that shares certain aspects with that described by Phillips et al. (2003) .
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AT focuses centrally on the appraisal of a stimulus or situation in terms of the goals and interests of an organism. The fundamental tenet of AT "is that people evaluate events in terms of the perceived relevance for their current needs and goals, including their ability to cope with consequences and the compatibility of the underlying actions with social norms and self ideals" (Scherer 2003) . Great emphasis is placed on the primary role of cognitive appraisal and the secondary role of emotional processing. The former leads to the latter, and appraisal is invoked to explain "emotion elicitation," with no role being left for emotion in the appraisal process itself. Appraisal processes can happen outside of conscious awareness, and at low levels of processing, allowing for rapid, automatic appraisals. Yet even when appraisals are rapid and automatic, emotion never contributes to, but is always an outcome of, appraisal. AT is thus a "feedforward" model of emotional processing, meaning that there is no feedback of emotional processes into appraisal systems, only outputs of emotional processes as a result of appraisal systems.
SMH assigns emotion precisely the opposite role. Emotional processing, according to SMH, is prior to and contributes to the appraisal of events within decision making (Damasio 1994 (Damasio , 1996 . Unlike AT, SMH assigns no role to the goals -low level or otherwise -of the person or organism in the elicitation of emotion.
Rather, emotion is elicited by first categorizing an event (i.e., is it a snake in front of me or a kitten?), followed by activating a link between the event category and emotional signals. The link that is the key element of the second step in this process is an association that is the result of past experience. Both the categorization of the event and the activation of the appropriate acquired association between the event and the elicited emotion can and usually do take place outside of conscious awareness. The emotional outcome then becomes input to a decision making process that follows the emotional appraisal. Both SMH and AT share this feedforward structure in relating cognition and emotion.
SMH developed as the result of a series of experiments conducted by Damasio, Bechara and colleagues (1996; . These involved an experimental paradigm known as the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), in which people choose cards from four decks, turn them over and see whether the card lists a gain or a loss.
Two of the decks of cards are risky, leading to a net loss, and two are safe, leading to a net gain. It turns out that people learn the difference between the safe and risky decks, and that this learning is accompanied by Emotional processing and political judgment 16 developing a strong SCR prior to making a card choice from the risky decks. SMH would predict that people who lack the capacity to generate SCR during the IGT should show impaired decision making, since they are unable to associate a key affective response, such as SCR, with a situations involving gains and losses. In fact, patients with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex show abnormalities in emotion and feeling, impaired learning on the IGT, and a failure to produce the SCR that accompanies learning.
We affirm the important contributions made by both AT and SMH, and we draw on both theoretical frameworks to develop a model of emotional processing that moves beyond a feedforward structure. Moving away from feedforward schemas toward a model involving recurrent, or feedback, connections allows one to account for the complex interplay between goals, emotions and evaluative processes within decision making.
Let us begin the development of our approach by defining when processing is emotional. The framework here holds that an information processing function is "emotional" just in case 1) it evaluates the information present in an event in terms of an organism's own normative, or autonormative, outcomes (i.e., goals) and 2) it results in affective responses in the body or in the activation of their representations in the brain. Categories of autonormative outcomes include sub-or supraliminal goals, desires and motor plans. Norms external to the person, such as social norms, are included in this framework, as long as those social norms exert their action in an autonormative sense. Similarly, norms that are suggested by evolutionary history are included in our framework, as long as there is a plausible internal mechanism for their action for a given individual within a given event. One example of such internalization of evolutionary norms is the drive toward homeostasis, defined as the relatively stable internal processes responsible for the maintenance of life.
We propose a Recurrent Multilevel Appraisal (RMA) model of emotional processing in decision making (Fig. 1 ). Under this model, emotional processing begins as the outcome of initial low-level evaluative processing in terms of autonormative outcomes, resulting in the activation of a set of autonomic and sensorimotor processes in the body, such as heart rate, SCR, pupillary dilation, changes in skeletal muscle tone, and/or the representations in the brain that mediate these activations. This way of categorizing emotional processing corresponds to the "body loop," and "as if loop" categories in SMH (Damasio 1996) . These are also shown in Fig. 1 for the RMA model. Emotional responses then go on to be used in two ways.
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Note that some of these downstream processes could include bringing additional evaluative processing functions online, since the early function may not be sufficient to process a given situation. The current framework proposes a second, and equally important, role for emotional responses: they are recurrent on the evaluative processing functions, influencing them even as these same functions process new information coming in due to the above-mentioned changes in selective attention, memory, imagery, semantic processing, etc. In other words, the evaluative processing and emotional processing functions form bidirectionally coupled, iterative loops that are extended in time. Constructs such as emotional "states" arise from integrating over the evaluative-emotional downstream system. Moods arise from long-lasting activation of emotional processes, and mood disorders could be due in part to the failure of proper evaluative-emotional recurrent integration.
What are some advantages of integrating AT and SMH in this way? One benefit is that the proposed feedback of emotional processing into evaluative processing functions is consistent with both affect-asinformation and affect-priming models of emotional effects on judgment (Forgas 1995) . Further, the current framework avoids the "amorphous affect" problem of these models, wherein both the sources and the forms of emotional inputs are only loosely defined. Drawing on SMH, we propose that activation of bodily responses and/or their representations are in fact the emotional responses. Also in line with SMH is the claim that these affects are required for adaptive outcomes in at least some areas of human judgment and decision making.
Our model also helps to interpret some recent experimental results that pose some difficulty for SMH. Recall that SMH predicts that someone incapable of generating an affective response in the body, such as SCR, to a novel loss event should be unable to learn the difference between the risky and safe decks in the IGT. Heims et al. (2004) , however, showed that patients who were physiologically incapable of generating SCR performed no different than matched controls on the IGT. In contrast to SMH, which views decision making as dependent upon the acquired association between an event and affective responses, RMA Emotional processing and political judgment 18 proposes that decision making depends on evaluative processing which is influenced by emotional processing in the run up to decision making. Under RMA, people lacking an SCR would continue to be able to evaluate situations, activate appropriate representations of bodily affective responses, and use this emotional processing to inform decision making. This is in fact what Heims et al. (2004) 
observed.
A final advantage is that RMA proposes a functional role for the ventromedial prefrontal cortex that is gaining support in the literature. We suggest that ventromedial prefrontal cortex is required for normal evaluative processing leading to appropriate emotional processing, and for the adaptive feedback of emotional processing upon evaluations. This view modifies SMH, which views the ventromedial prefrontal cortex as the locus of acquired associations between events and emotional outcomes. RMA proposes instead that ventromedial prefrontal cortex maintains a representation of agreements between an organism's planned goals and experienced outcomes. Such a view is consistent with Raichle's work in defining a network that monitors the environment for consistency with or divergence from an organisms goals Raichle et al. 2001; nicely reviewed in Schreiber 2005 ). Thus our model accounts for the deficits in judgment and decision making seen in patients with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Anderson et al. 1999; Anderson et al. 2000; Damasio 1996) . Additionally, several recent studies are consistent with such a function for ventromedial prefrontal cortex. In one brain activation experiment using the IGT with healthy participants, Critchley et al. (2000) showed that the start of activation in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex reliably preceded the peak of the SCR by 4.2 seconds. This is consistent with the possibility of an evaluative process in this brain area whose outcome participates in generating the SCR. In another experiment with healthy participants, Zysset and coworkers (2003; measured brain activation while asking subjects to agree or disagree with propositions either stating their evaluation of something or someone (e.g., "Gerhard Schröder is a good chancellor.") or their episodic, or personal, memory about something or someone (e.g., "I voted for Gerhard Schröder."). There was greater activation in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex during the evaluative task than in the episodic memory task. Raichle and colleagues (2001) also reported increased activation in ventromedial prefrontal cortex that associated with a self-referential evaluative task.
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We fully expect that the RMA model of emotional processing described here will require revision on the basis of future experiments investigating the role of emotional processing in decision making, including in the domain of political judgment. One of our aims was to propose a model consistent with neuroscientific data that could be directly compared to models of emotional processing already being used by political psychologists (Cassino and Lodge 2005; Feldman, Huddy, and Cassese 2005; Schreiber 2005; MacKuen et al. 2005 ). We also hoped to provide an example of how key terms of emotion are used within decision neuroscience.
Met ho d
There are important methodological challenges in the design and interpretation of experiments applying cutting edge tools of decision neuroscience to the problems of interest within political psychology.
We consider some challenges inherent in functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and the lesion method, both central to developing theories relating brain and behavior. Measuring the dependence of human behavior on the brain is anything but straightforward. Inferential challenges are difficult enough for methodological specialists, but for those outside a given specialty, even those within other areas of cognitive science, evaluating reports of brain-behavior associations and proceeding from them to useful inferences about brain-behavior mechanisms can be daunting. Fortunately, keeping these challenges in mind should prevent making key mistakes both in interpreting empirical findings and in using those findings to construct new models. Since both the challenges and responses to them are well-described elsewhere (Adolphs 2002; Cacioppo et al. 2003; Lieberman, Schreiber, and Ochsner 2003; Raichle 2003; Logothetis 2003; Logothetis and Wandell 2004) , they will receive only a brief overview here. Additionally, until very recently, neuroscience lacked a good understanding of which neural signals most closely corresponded to the BOLD signal. Most of the field assumed that the BOLD signal was directly related to, and even caused by, electrical impulses, known as action potentials, that neurons use to communicate over longer distances. This identification of the BOLD signal with action potentials was due in part to the fact that the measurement of action potentials was long the dominant method of relating neural activity to information processing and behavior. It is still utilized widely and highly influential. Recently, however, the groups of Nikos Logothetis (2002; 2004; and Martin Lauritzen (Caesar, Thomsen, and Lauritzen 2003; Lauritzen 2001; Mathiesen et al. 1998) showed that the BOLD signal is not caused by action potentials of neurons at all, since eliminating all action potentials has no effect on BOLD signal. Rather, BOLD signal associates with smaller electrical potentials at the junctures, called synapses, between neurons in the brain. This has major implications for how to interpret the BOLD signal across the entire brain, because circuits in different regions of the brain may have very different kinds of junctures between neurons even when the information output (i.e., action potentials) of the regions is the same. So the BOLD signal can differ depending only on differences in circuit organization, even for circuits in the same general area of the brain and under circumstances that yield identical numbers of action potentials.
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Another aspect of brain activity measurement by fMRI is that the measured signal changes are on the order of 0.1% to 1% of the total measured signal (Raichle 2003) . To understand this more fully, it helps to remember that the BOLD signal is generally a contrast in signal between two or more measurements, each conducted under some set of defined conditions. What this means is that reported fMRI activations, or areas where the brain looks to be "lit up" by bright spots are not the result of the neural circuitry in those areas going from an "off" state to an "on" state. Rather, activations are typically the result of a brain area going from giving a signal of, say, 10 to a signal of 10.05, in a statistically significant manner. Crucial to drawing mechanistic inferences from evidence in the form of BOLD signal contrasts, then, is a solid grasp of the details of each contrasting condition and the differences between them.
3.b. Individual differences in the brain
It is common practice in fMRI research to put all the participants' brains into one "standard" brain space using methods termed "spatial normalization." However, it is widely acknowledged individual brains typically are not identical in shape, especially in the cortical regions, or, more importantly, in patterns of localized activations. Indeed, in normal humans there is a threefold difference in the overall size of the region of the brain that is the first step along the visual processing chain, a region called primary visual cortex (Andrews, Halpern, and Purves 1997) . Differences in functional patterns of brain activation are even more striking. In a study of episodic memory, which is memory for the details of personal experiences and is a form of memory that is likely to play a significant role in political judgment and decision making (Lieberman, Schreiber, and Ochsner 2003) , Gazzaniga and colleagues (2002) saw extensive individual differences in brain activation patterns that were reliable across repeated measurements. That is, different individuals performing an identical episodic memory task showed extensive and replicable individual differences in patterns of brain activity, while the individual patterns themselves did not change significantly across measurements. Grouping individual brains into a common space thus results in washing out potentially important empirically determined associations between information processing and brain activity. Increasingly, fMRI research is Emotional processing and political judgment 22 taking the implications of such findings into account, with recommendations that analyses using spatial normalization always be accompanied by individual analyses (Crivello et al. 2002; Miller et al. 2002; Saxe, Carey, and Kanwisher 2004) . In fact, scholars are beginning to treat individual differences as important in their own right and worthy of greater empirical investigation (Kosslyn et al. 2002) .
3.c. fMRI activations are tentative associations
Cacioppo (2003) has pointed out, whether or not a brain area is activated during a given information processing condition does not by itself establish that the brain area is or is not required for the information processing function under investigation. Observed brain activation could be 1) due to a failure to control for all key contextual variables in contrasting task conditions, or 2) the result of activity in another circuit in another area that actually carries out the information processing function. Conversely, failure to observe brain activation could arise even in the presence of differences in neural activity, if the differences are in different neural circuits that differ substantially in synaptic organization (Logothetis and Wandell 2004) . Activation maps resulting from fMRI experiments can thus best be interpreted as hypothetical associations between information processing and brain activity. These hypotheses would require corroboration using other methods.
It should be emphasized that this account of fMRI methodology in no way undermines its usefulness as a central method in understanding social networks of social and political judgment. The fact is that fMRI allows what was once thought to be impossible: a noninvasive view into brain processing during complex behavior in human participants. Its limitations do not call into question the fMRI neuroimaging literature in general. Indeed, it should be obvious that any scientific methodology will have limits, and we have endeavored only to describe some of the limits to fMRI here. Without such description, there is a danger that the exciting interdisciplinary endeavor that we foresee between political scientists and neuroscientists will not develop as rigorously as we know it can. This is especially the case because most popular accounts of fMRI research convey the false impression that the methodology directly measures brain activity, understood as Emotional processing and political judgment 23 neural activity or spiking. Even accomplished science writers who follow neuroscience can, in their enthusiasm, convey this impression unintentionally, as was seen in a recent article on mirror neurons in the New York Times (Blakeslee 2006) . 1 An open acknowledgment of the limits of fMRI will, we hope, result in more sophisticated collaborations between neuroscientists and political scientists, leading to elegant experimental designs and subsequent careful interpretations of findings. The work described by Schreiber (2005) serves as an example of careful approach to collaborative work. Although we would characterize the existence of mirror neurons in the human brain as an hypothesis at this point, and though we would caution against too extreme a dichotomization between automatic and controlled processing, the work that Schreiber has pioneered is immensely helpful in furthering our understanding of political judgment.
3.d. The limits of the lesion method
One of these other methods, the lesion method, is a classic technique usually employed to test whether a given brain area is required for an information processing function under investigation. A challenge to applying the lesion method is that there is no clear one-to-one correspondence between the lesioned area and the information processing function of interest. The lesion method tests patients who have sustained focal neurological damage to determine if the damaged areas associate with response abnormalities during different information processing conditions. Differences from carefully matched control subjects define any observed abnormalities. If a lesion corresponds with an information processing abnormality, the resulting interpretation is that the lesioned area is required for the specified information processing function to behave normally. Yet this does not mean that the lesioned area is the locus of that function, since the damaged area could be just a required part of a distributed circuit enacting the function. More importantly, when experiments show normal information processing responses despite the presence of lesions, it isn't possible to conclude from that result alone a normal brain carrying out these functions would not require the areas of 24 lesion. The absence of lesion effects could be due to brain plasticity following a lesion event, where physiological responses to a traumatic event reorganize regions outside of the original functional circuit in a way to restore function, as is often known to be the case (Fridman et al. 2004; Green 2003; Holloway 2003; Thulborn, Carpenter, and Just 1999; Karbe et al. 1998) . There are experiments with nonhuman animal models showing that an over-reliance on lesion data can result in the erroneous conclusion that a given brain area is not required for pre-lesion, normal information processing (Moore, Rothholtz, and King 2001) .
Taken together, these methodological challenges strongly suggest that constructing inferential models of information processing in the brain need to proceed by an integrative approach, drawing on a selection of methods. Of course, the list of methods and methodological challenges presented here is not exhaustive, and could be expanded to include psychophysiology, event-related EEG potentials (i.e., brainwaves), magnetoencephalography (MEG), and computational modeling. Of paramount importance prior to applying any of these approaches is to formulate and employ behavioral tasks that are sufficiently constrained and quantifiable so that they can parametrically vary the processes under investigation. Assuming one achieves this, there is a clear advantage to integrative approaches. Converging evidence obtained using a variety of methods allows scholars to weigh a model's agreement across investigative approaches, determining probabilistically the level of empirical support for each component of the model. Price and Friston (2002) recommended a variant of such an approach, and outlined it for a proposed information processing function f(I), as follows: 1) identify candidate brain areas corresponding systems performing f(I) by using neuroimaging with normal subjects in 2 or more appropriate contrasting conditions; 2) determine whether patients with lesions specific to one or more of the candidate brain areas show deficits in behavior thought to rely on f(I);
3) if no deficits are found, use neuroimaging with these lesion patients to identify "latent" candidate brain areas corresponding to systems performing f(I), and proceed to step (2). Although this approach also faces the challenges outlined above, it and others like it should decrease the likelihood of inferential errors. If integrative approaches like this are desirable for well-defined problems in the neuroscience of information processing, they are even more appropriate in the study of a system as complex as human judgment and decision making in politics (Lieberman, Schreiber, and Ochsner 2003; Cacioppo et al. 2000; Adolphs 2002 ).
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Ev ide nce
4.a. Decision and emotion
By now there is an abundance of evidence linking lesions of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex both with impaired emotional processing and with profound deficits in making adaptive decisions in ordinary life, as described in a number of recent reviews by Bechara and colleagues (Bechara 2001 (Bechara , 2004 Bechara et al. 2001; Bechara, Tranel, and Damasio 2000) . Anderson and colleagues showed that two adult subjects who sustained ventromedial prefrontal lesions prior to 16 months of age were not only more severely impaired than those with adult lesions in making adaptive decisions having to do with their personal well-being (Anderson et al. 2000) , but demonstrated something like an acquired sociopathy in their social behavior and moral decision making (Anderson et al. 1999 ). The precise mechanism by which circuits in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex facilitate adaptive decision making is not yet known. SMH (Damasio 1996) proposes an associational mechanism between situational features and affective responses, while the framework of RMA described here emphasizes an evaluative process resulting in the activation of emotional responses. However, both of these proposals may be inaccurate.
Interdisciplinary collaborations between political psychologists and decision neuroscientists should not only result in a better understanding of how affective intelligence works, in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and elsewhere, but have the potential to produce mechanisms relevant to complex political constructs such as group identification, self-determination, tolerance, etc.
4.b. Social judgment and emotion
Judgment and decision making in the social realm shows perhaps some of the strongest association with emotional processing, where the association is measured both by examining the effects of induced Emotional processing and political judgment 26 moods and emotions on judgment and by associating judgments with neural systems thought to have specialized roles in emotional processing.
4.b.i. Social attribution and mood
A large and growing literature in personality and social psychology implicates the involvement of long-lasting emotional processes, or moods, when normal subjects make judgments about the emotional state, intentions, and dispositions of other people (Forgas 2000; Bower 1991; Forgas and Forster 1987) . One very reliable finding is mood-congruent social attribution, wherein, for example, inducing sadness in a subject covaries with that subject's attributing sadness to another person. An important critique of this work suggests that semantic priming, rather than emotional processing, is the cause of the observed associations between mood and social judgments. Priming is a term meaning the activation of one concept by the presentation of another concept, a process that goes on outside of awareness. The critique proposes that mood induction techniques inadvertently use emotion-specific concepts, and that it is conceptual priming and not mood induction that activates semantic networks, defined as structured connections between concepts related in meaning, that include specific emotion concepts.
Innes- Ker and Niedenthal (2002) tested this critique by using either an emotional sentence unscrambling task or a mood induction technique prior to asking 186 subjects to attribute emotions to a person, M, based only on reading a short narrative description of "A Morning in M's Life." Sentences fell into happy, sad and neutral emotional categories. Mood induction used happy, sad and neutral film clips, coupled with mood maintenance for happy and sad conditions by playing music while subjects read M's story. In the sentence unscrambling task, sentence condition (happy, sad, neutral) had no effect on mood, as assessed using the Brief Mood Introspection Scale (Mayer and Gaschke 1988) . However, for mood induction, subjects in the happy condition were happier than those in the neutral condition, who in turn were happier than those in the sad condition. For sadness, the pattern was reversed. Only the mood induction technique, and not the sentence unscrambling task, resulted in mood congruent associations between emotion condition during Emotional processing and political judgment 27 induction and the attribution of emotions to M in the story. That is, subjects who unscrambled sentences categorized as happy were no more likely to attribute happiness to M than they were to attribute sadness.
Subjects who unscrambled sentences categorized as sad were no more likely to attribute sadness to M than they were to attribute happiness. Only when mood induction techniques were used was there a congruence effect between emotional induction condition and emotional attribution.
This important work is consistent with the position that mood congruent effects on social attribution are primarily a result of mood and not semantic priming. Further, it suggests the intriguing possibility that normal conceptual acquisition or formation in inferring the emotional states of other people requires emotional processing at some level. This proposal is taken up in the following section.
4.b.ii. Social judgment and neural systems of emotion
Is emotional processing required for making normal, adaptive judgments about the emotions, preferences, intentions and beliefs of other people? Here again, emotional processing can include but does not exclusively refer to conscious feelings, and adaptive judgments can include both those available to conscious reflection and those that are only subconscious associations influencing thought and behavior. The answer to this question appears to be yes, according to proposals that use evidence from brain areas implicated both in normal emotional experiences and in normal social judgment and decision making, to argue that both emotion and social judgment use shared neural systems.
Abundant evidence has revealed that several key brain areas that either are required for normal emotional experience or are differentially activated by emotional conditions are also required for normal social judgment or are differentially activated in social judgment tasks (Adolphs 2003 (Adolphs , 2003 . The areas that most consistently show this association are the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, the right insula and somatosensory cortices (Adolphs et al. 2000) , and the amygdala. Bar-On et al. (2003) tested 6 subjects with bilateral focal lesions of anterior and posterior ventromedial prefrontal cortex, 3 subjects with unilateral lesions of the right insular and somatosensory Emotional processing and political judgment 28 cortices, and 3 subjects with unilateral lesions of the amygdala on emotional intelligence (Bar-On 1997 and social functioning (Tranel, Bechara, and Denburg 2002) . They compared performance of these groups with a group of control subjects who had lesions that did not involve the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, the right insula and somatosensory cortices or the amygdala. The study found no differences between any of the experimental groups and control group on full IQ, executive function, perception or memory, nor any indications of psychopathology. But each experimental group was significantly impaired on emotional intelligence compared to the control group. Combining all three experimental groups yielded significant deficits in social functioning compared to controls. Shamay-Tsoory et al. (2003) tested 12 subjects with focal lesions to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex on empathy and the recognition of social faux pas. They found that these subjects, as a group, provided significantly lower empathy scores and were significantly more impaired at recognizing social faux pas than age-matched (but not IQ-matched) controls and people with unilateral lesions to the posterior cortex of the brain.
Bilateral amygdala lesions impair normal attributions of trustworthiness (Adolphs, Tranel, and Damasio 1998) . Stone et al. (2003) tested two subjects who sustained bilateral amygdala damage after the age of 50 on several tasks designed to assess whether these subjects could form beliefs about another person's state of mind (i.e., a "theory of mind"). The tasks included the recognition of social faux pas and attributing feelings and thoughts to a person based only on seeing that person's eyes. Compared to age-matched (but not IQ-matched) controls lacking any lesion, the subjects with bilateral amygdala lesion performed significantly worse at detecting faux pas, while one of the lesioned subjects performed significantly worse at making social attributions from the eyes alone.
Con clusio ns
The outlook for productive collaborative work between decision neuroscientists and political psychologists is promising. Methodological developments in this expanding endeavor will undoubtedly Emotional processing and political judgment 29 include the increased participation of people with focal brain lesions in behavioral and neuroimaging experiments, as already mentioned above. New areas of inquiry will likely include several of the following: 1) assessing whether emotional processing is differentially related to consciously held autonormative beliefs and subliminal autonormative outcomes; 2) the interaction of emotional category, emotional intensity (valence and arousal), and stable individual dispositions on the assessment of politically relevant propositions; 3) the role of empathy, as distinguished from sympathy (Scheler 1954) , in adaptively assessing an opponent's political strategy; and 4) the reciprocal relationship between emotional processing and the use of metaphor in political persuasion.
